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ABSTRACT
The upcoming European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) prohibits the processing and exploitation of some
categories of personal data (health, political orientation, sex-
ual preferences, religious beliefs, ethnic origin, etc.) due to
the obvious privacy risks that may be derived from a mali-
cious use of such type of information. These categories are
referred to as sensitive personal data. Facebook has been re-
cently fined e1.2M in Spain for collecting, storing and pro-
cessing sensitive personal data for advertising purposes. This
paper quantifies the portion of Facebook users in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) who are labeled with interests linked to
sensitive personal data. The results of our study reveal that
Facebook labels 73% EU users with sensitive interests. This
corresponds to 40% of the overall EU population. We also
estimate that a malicious third-party could unveil the identity
of Facebook users that have been assigned a sensitive inter-
est at a cost as low as e0.015 per user. Finally, we propose
and implement a web browser extension to inform Facebook
users of the sensitive interests Facebook has assigned them.
Author Keywords
FDVT, GDPR, sensitive data, personal data, protected data,
Facebook, privacy, online advertising, EU, European Union
INTRODUCTION
The citizens of the European Union (EU) show serious con-
cerns regarding the management of personal information by
online services. The 2015 Eurobarometer about data protec-
tion [22] reveals that: 63% of EU citizens do not trust online
businesses, more than half do not like providing personal in-
formation in return for free services, and 53% do not like that
Internet companies use their personal information in tailored
advertising. The EU reacted to citizens’ concerns with the
approval of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
[8], which defines a new regulatory framework in the man-
agement of personal information. EU member states were
given a period of two years to transpose it into their national
legislation, until May 2018.
The GDPR (as well as many other EU national data protec-
tion laws) defines some categories of personal data as very
sensitive and imposes the prohibition to process them with
very few exceptions (e.g., the user provides explicit consent
to process that data for some specific purpose). These cate-
gories of data are indistinguishably referred to as “Specially
Protected Data”, “Special Categories of Personal Data” or
“Sensitive Data”. In particular, the GDPR defines as sensi-
tive personal data: “data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
Figure 1. Snapshot of an ad received by one of the authors papers & ad
preference list showing that FB have inferred this person was interested
in Homosexuality.
union membership, and the processing of genetic data, bio-
metric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural
person’s sex life or sexual orientation”.
Due to the obvious legal, ethical and privacy implications
of processing sensitive personal data, it is important to un-
veil whether online services are commercially exploiting such
sensitive information. In case it is happening, it is also essen-
tial to measure the size of the problem. That means, the por-
tion of users/citizens who may be affected by the exploitation
of their sensitive personal data. In this paper, we address these
crucial questions focusing in online advertising, which repre-
sents the most important source of revenue for most online
services. In particular, we consider Facebook (FB), the sec-
ond most important advertising platform (just after Google)
in this market.
This research focuses in FB due to an episode that happened
to one of the authors of this paper. He received the ad shown
on the left side of Figure 1. The referred ad stated: “Con-
nect with the gay community & rent affordable places from
people like you. Book Now”. The company running the ad
campaign is an online service targeting the gay community.
FB users are labeled with the so-called ad preferences, which
represent potential interests of the users. FB assigns a user
different ad preferences based on her online activity within
this social network and in third-party websites tracked by FB.
Advertisers running ad campaigns target groups of users that
have been assigned a particular ad preference (e.g., target FB
users interested in “Starbucks”). The referred author found
that “Homosexuality” was one of the ad preferences FB had
assigned him (see Figure 1 right side). He had neither ex-
plicitly defined his sexual orientation in any FB setting, nor
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granted explicit permission to FB to be targeted based on his
sexual orientation.
This episode illustrates that FB is actually processing sensi-
tive personal information, which is prohibited in the upcom-
ing EU GDPR and also in some national data protection reg-
ulations in Europe. This claim has been recently confirmed
when the Spanish Data Protection Agency (DPA) fined FB
with e1.2M for violating the Spanish data protection regula-
tion [6]. The Spanish DPA argued that FB “collects, stores
and uses data, including specially protected data, for adver-
tising purposes without obtaining consent.”
Motivated by these events and the upcoming enforcement of
the GDPR in the European Union, the main goal of this paper
is quantifying the portion of EU citizens and FB users that
have been assigned ad preferences linked to sensitive per-
sonal data.
To achieve our goal we analyze more than 5.5M ad prefer-
ences (126K unique) assigned to more than 4.5K FB users
who have installed the Data Valuation Tool for Facebook
Users (FDVT) browser extension [12]. The reason for using
ad preferences assigned to FDVT users is that we can prove
the ad preferences considered in our study have been indeed
assigned to real users.
The first contribution of this paper is a methodology that
combines natural language processing techniques and man-
ual classification conducted by 12 panelists to obtain those ad
preferences in our dataset linked to sensitive personal data.
These are ad preferences that may be used to reveal: ethnic or
racial origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, health infor-
mation or sexual orientation. For instance, the ad preferences
“Homosexuality” and “Communism” may reveal the sexual
orientation and the political preference of a user, respectively.
Once we have identified the list of sensitive ad preferences,
we use it to query the FB Ads Manager in order to obtain
the number of FB users and citizens exposed to sensitive ad
preferences in the whole EU as well as in each one of its
member states. This quantification is our second contribution,
which accomplishes the main goal of the paper.
Finally, after illustrating privacy and ethics risks derived from
the exploitation of FB sensitive ad preferences, we present an
extension of the FDVT that informs users of the sensitive ad
preferences FB has assigned them. This is the last contribu-
tion of this paper.
Our research leads to the following main insights:
We have identified 2092 (1.66%) sensitive ad preferences
out of the 126k present in our dataset.
FB assigns in average 16 sensitive ad preferences to FDVT
users.
More than 73% EU FB users, which corresponds to 40%
EU citizens, are labeled with at least one of the Top 500
(i.e., most popular) sensitive ad preferences from our
dataset.
Women show a significantly higher exposure than men to
sensitive ad preferences. Similarly, The Early Adulthood
group (20-39 years old) is the one showing more exposure.
We perform a ball-park estimation that suggests that un-
veiling the identity of FB users labeled with sensitive ad
preferences may be as cheap as e0.015 per user.
BACKGROUND
Facebook Ads Manager
Advertisers configure their ads campaigns through the Face-
book (FB) Ads Manager1. It allows advertisers to define the
audience (i.e., user profile) they want to target with their ad-
vertising campaigns. It can be accessed through either a dash-
board or an API. The FB Ads Manager offers advertisers a
wide range of configuration parameters such as (but not lim-
ited to): location (country, region, city, zip code, etc.), demo-
graphic parameters (gender, age, language, etc.), behaviors
(mobile device, OS and/or web browser used, traveling fre-
quency, etc.), interests (sports, food, cars, beauty, etc.).
The interest parameter is the most relevant for our work. It in-
cludes hundreds of thousands of possibilities capturing users’
interest of any type. These interests are organized in a hierar-
chical structure with several levels. The first level is formed
by 14 categories2. In addition to the interests included in this
hierarchy, the FB Ads Manager offers the Detailed Targeting
search bar where users can type any free text and it suggests
interests linked to such text. In this paper, we will leverage
the interest parameter to identify potential sensitive interests.
Advertisers can configure their target audiences based on any
combination of the described parameters. An example of an
audience could be “Users living in Italy, ranging between 30
and 40 years old, male and interested in Fast Food”.
Finally, the FB Ads Manager provides detailed information
about the configured audience from which the most relevant
parameter for our paper is the Potential Reach that reports the
number of registered FB users matching the defined audience.
Facebook ad preferences
FB assigns to each user a set of ad preferences, i.e., a set of
interests, derived from the data and activity of the user in FB
and external websites, apps and online services where FB is
present. These ad preferences are indeed the interests offered
to advertisers in the FB Ads Manager to configure their audi-
ences3. Therefore, if a user is assigned “Watches” within her
list of ad preferences, she will be a potential target of any FB
advertising campaign configured to reach users interested in
watches.
Any user can access and edit (add or remove) her ad prefer-
ences4, but very few users are aware of this option. When a
1https://www.facebook.com/ads/manager
2Business and industry, Education, Family and relationships, Fitness and wellness, Food
and drink, Hobbies and activities, Lifestyle and culture, News and entertainment, Peo-
ple, Shopping and fashion, Sports and outdoors, Technology, Travel places and events,
Empty.
3Note that given that interests and ad preferences refer to the same thing, we use these
two terms indistinguishably in the rest of the paper.
4Access and edit ad preference list: https://facebook.com/ads/preferences/edit
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user positions the mouse on a specific ad preference item, a
pop-up text indicates why the user has been assigned this ad
preference. By examining 5.5M ad preferences assigned to
FDVT users (see Subsection FDVT), we have found 6 rea-
sons for the assignment of ad preferences: (i) This is a pref-
erence you added, (ii) You have this preference because we
think it may be relevant to you based on what you do on Face-
book, such as pages you’ve liked or ads you’ve clicked, (iii)
You have this preference because you clicked on an ad related
to..., (iv) You have this preference because you installed the
app..., (v) You have this preference because you liked a Page
related to..., (vi) You have this preference because of com-
ments, posts, shares or reactions you made related to...
FDVT
The Data Valuation Tool for Facebook Users (FDVT) [12]
is a web browser extension currently available for Google
Chrome5 and Mozilla Firefox6. It provides FB users with
a real-time estimation of the revenue they are generating for
Facebook according to their profile and the number of ads
they visualize and click during a Facebook session. More
than 6K users have installed the FDVT between its public
release in October 2016 and February 2018. The FDVT col-
lects (among other data) the ad preferences FB assigns to the
user. We will leverage this information to identify sensitive
ad preferences assigned to users that have installed the FDVT.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
General Data Protection Regulation
The forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [8] will enter into force in May 2018 and will be
the reference data protection regulation in all 28 EU coun-
tries. The GDPR includes an article that regulates the use of
Sensitive Personal Data. Article 9 is entitled “Processing of
special categories of personal data” and literally states in its
first paragraph: “Processing of personal data revealing racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophi-
cal beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing
of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation
shall be prohibited”.
After enunciating the prohibition of processing any of the
items listed in the paragraph, the GDPR introduces in its sec-
ond paragraph 10 exceptions in which the paragraph 1 of the
article shall not apply. None of these exceptions apply to the
processing and exploitation of sensitive personal data through
ad preferences in the case of FB.
Following we list the exceptions included in GDPR Article
9 that allow processing sensitive information and discuss for
each of them the reason why they do not apply to the case
of FB ad preferences. In the exceptions text, the term data
subject refers to users in the context of FB and the term data
controller refers to FB itself.
5https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/fdvt-social-network-data/
blednbbpnnambjaefhlocghajeohlhmh
6https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/fdvt
(a) “the data subject has given explicit consent to the pro-
cessing of those personal data for one or more specified pur-
poses, except where Union or Member State law provide that
the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted
by the data subject”.
In most cases, ad preferences are inferred out of the activ-
ity of the user in FB (e.g., like a page, click on an ad, etc.).
However, none of these activities imply an explicit consent of
the user to be assigned ad preferences related to sensitive per-
sonal data, which is exploited for advertising purposes. For
instance, in the example described in the introduction involv-
ing one of the paper authors, this person did not provide any
explicit consent that allows FB processing data related to his
sexual orientation. In addition, there are no reasons why the
user could not lift explicit consent to FB to process her sensi-
tive personal data for advertising purposes. As we described
in Section Facebook Terms of Service, by accepting the FB
Terms of Service, users grant permission to process and store
personal data, but there is no reference to sensitive personal
data. FB should implement an explicit and transparent pro-
cess to obtain explicit permission to use sensitive personal
data, which is not the case nowadays.
(b) “processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out
the obligations and exercising specific rights of the controller
or of the data subject in the field of employment and social
security and social protection law in so far as it is autho-
rised by Union or Member State law or a collective agree-
ment pursuant to Member State law providing for appropri-
ate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the interests of
the data subject”.
This exception does not apply to FB since processing sen-
sitive personal data for ad preferences is not related to em-
ployment or social security field. Similarly, FB activity is not
related to the protection of fundamental rights and interests
of FB users.
(c) “processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of
the data subject or of another natural person where the data
subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent”.
FB has nothing to do with the vital interests of FB users.
In addition, the vast majority of FB users are physically and
legally capable of giving explicit consent. Therefore, this ex-
ception does not apply to FB.
(d) “processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate
activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation, as-
sociation or any other not-for-profit body with a political,
philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on condition
that the processing relates solely to the members or to former
members of the body or to persons who have regular contact
with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal
data are not disclosed outside that body without the consent
of the data subject.”
FB is a private profit company that does not match the organi-
zations described in this exception. Therefore, this exception
does not apply to the case of FB.
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(e) “processing relates to personal data which are manifestly
made public by the data subject.”
In the vast majority of cases sensitive ad preferences are as-
signed based on the activity of the user (e.g., page like, ad
click) rather than an act of the user to “manifestly made pub-
lic” some sensitive personal data. We have listed in the paper
the reasons FB uses to explain why an ad preference has been
assigned. None of these reasons is associated with the public
disclosure of personal data in the user profile or wall. Hence,
this exception does not apply to the vast majority of users in
FB.
(f) “processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or
defense of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their
judicial capacity.”
This exception does not apply to FB since it is very unlikely
that ad preferences can be used to the establishment, exer-
cise or defense or legal claims. Ad preferences are used for
advertising purposes.
(g) “processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public
interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law which
shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence
of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and
specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the
interests of the data subject.”
FB processes sensitive personal data for commercial pur-
poses. The processing of sensitive personal data in the case
of FB has nothing to do with public interest. Hence, this ex-
ception does not apply to the case of FB.
(h) “processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive
or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working
capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision
of health or social care or treatment or the management of
health or social care systems and services on the basis of
Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a
health professional and subject to the conditions and safe-
guards referred to in paragraph 37.”
FB operation has nothing to do with any of the premises in-
cluded in this exception. Therefore, this exception does not
apply to the case of FB.
(i) “processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in
the area of public health, such as protecting against serious
cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of
quality and safety of healthcare and of medicinal products
or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member State
law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safe-
guard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particu-
lar professional secrecy.”
FB operation, and in particular the exploitation of ad prefer-
ences, is not related to the area of public health. Therefore,
this exception does not apply to the case of Facebook.
(j) “processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
7Paragraph 3 can be found in [8]
statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based
on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate
to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data
protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to
safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data
subject”
FB sensitive ad preferences are (and should) not be publicly
shared. In addition, processing sensitive data from FB users
is neither critical for scientific nor for statistical purposes.
Therefore, this exception does not apply to the case of Face-
book.
Therefore, according to the GDPR text covering sensitive per-
sonal data processing, the practice of labeling FB users with
ad preferences associated with sensitive personal data may be
contravening the article 9 of the GDPR.
Facebook fined in Spain
In September 2017 the Spanish Data Protection Agency
(AEPD) fined Facebooke1.2M for violating the data protec-
tion regulation. In the fine’s resolution [6] the AEPD claims
that FB collects, stores and processes sensitive personal data
for advertising purposes without obtaining consent from the
users.
In the following, we literally list the main elements included
in the Spanish DPA resolution associated with thee1.2M fine
imposed to FB for violating the Spanish data protection reg-
ulation.
- The Agency notes that the social network collects, stores
and uses data, including specially protected data, for ad-
vertising purposes without obtaining consent.
- The data on ideology, sex, religious beliefs, personal pref-
erences or browsing activity are collected directly, through
interaction with their services or from third party pages
without clearly informing the user about how and for what
purpose will use those data.
- Facebook does not obtain unambiguous, specific and in-
formed consent from users to process their data since the
information it offers is not adequate
- Users’ personal data are not totally canceled when they are
no longer useful for the purpose for which they were col-
lected, nor when the user explicitly requests their removal.
- The Agency declares the existence of two serious and one
very serious infringements of the Data Protection Law and
imposes on Facebook a total sanction of 1,200,000 euros.
- The AEPD is part of a Contact Group together with the Au-
thorities of Belgium, France, Hamburg (Germany) and the
Netherlands, that also initiated their respective investiga-
tion procedures to the company.
This fine also confirms that currently enforced data protec-
tion regulations in some EU countries (that will be substi-
tuted by the GDPR in May 2018) are already considering in-
appropriate the processing and storage of sensitive personal
data without an unambiguous and specific informed consent
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of the user. Therefore, FB may have been contravening data
protection laws of several EU countries for some time.
It is worth noting that also in US Facebook was involved in
a civil rights lawsuit for allowing advertisers to target people
based on the attribute ethnic affinity. FB renamed such at-
tribute to multicultural affinity and accepted that it could not
be combined in campaigns targeting housing, employment
and financial services [15][1][3][26].
Facebook Terms of Service
We have carefully revised the terms of service and data policy
subscribed by users and advertisers on Facebook.
EU FB users consent FB to transfer to and process personal
data in the United States. However, the GDPR (and other
regulations in Europe) clearly differentiate between personal
data and some categories of the so-called specially protected
or sensitive personal data. In addition, the referred regulations
require obtaining explicit permission from the user to process
and store sensitive personal data. Still, after our thorough re-
view of FB terms of service and data policy, we could neither
find a clear piece of text where EU users are informed that FB
is processing and storing sensitive personal data according to
the GDPR definition, nor a place where users provide explicit
consent for the processing of this data.
FB defines in its advertising policy that ads must not include
content that asserts or implies personal attributes. By per-
sonal attributes, FB refers to most of the categories of sen-
sitive data listed in the GDPR. Facebook provides examples
of what content in an ad is considered appropriate and what
is not. For instance, Are you gay?, Do you have diabetes?
andMeet other Buddhists are not accepted, whereasGay dat-
ing online now, New diabetes treatment available and Look-
ing for Buddhists near you? are valid. Therefore, Facebook
prohibits to use content that directly implies to acknowledge
some particular sensitive personal information from the tar-
geted user, but not indirect implications associated with the
content. Surprisingly, the ad received by one of the authors
referred in the Introduction (see Figure 1) was actually con-
travening FB rules. The text included in the ad was: Connect
with the gay community & rent affordable places from peo-
ple like you. Book Now. By using the expression “like you”,
the advertising is explicitly indicating that the author of the
paper is gay. Finally, it is important to note that FB ads pol-
icy does not prevent by any means that advertisers target FB
users based on sensitive personal data, but only regulates the
content of the delivered ad.
FB users subscribe Facebook Terms of Service8 when
opening a FB account. This is the entry document where
users are informed what FB is doing with their personal
data. However, in order to better understand the details
regarding FB data management users are redirected to
another document referred to as Data Policy9. We found
three sections very relevant for our research in the Terms of
Service document:
8https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
9https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
Section 16. Special Provisions Applicable to Users Out-
side the United States. This section includes the following
clause “You consent to have your personal data transferred
to and processed in the United States.” While these grants
DB sufficient permission to process and store personal data,
the GDPR and some precedent data protection regulations
in some EU countries establish a clear difference between
personal data and “specially protected” or “sensitive”
personal data. To the best of our knowledge, FB does not
obtain explicit permission to process and store sensitive
personal data.
Section 9. About Advertisements and Other Commercial
Content Served or Enhanced by Facebook. In this section,
users are informed that FB can use the user information,
name, picture, etc. for advertising and commercial purposes.
Therefore, it is true that FB states that users’ information will
be used for commercial purposes.
Section 10. Special Provisions Applicable to Advertisers .
Advertisers are forwarded to two more documents Self-Serve
Ad Terms10 (not very relevant for our research) and Adver-
tising Policies11. The latter document includes 13 sections
from which Section 4.1212 (4-Prohibited Content; 12- Per-
sonal attributes) is very relevant for our paper. Section 4.12
literally states: “Ads must not contain content that asserts
or implies personal attributes. This includes direct or indi-
rect assertions or implications about a persons race, ethnic
origin, religion, beliefs, age, sexual orientation or practices,
gender identity, disability, medical condition (including phys-
ical or mental health), financial status, membership in a trade
union, criminal record, or name.”. Examples of what content
is allowed and what content is prohibited are provided in the
Advertising Policies.
DATASET
In order to analyze the presence of sensitive ad preferences
and quantify the portion of EU FB users that have been as-
signed some of them, we should be able to collect a large
dataset of ad preferences assigned to users. Hence, in case
we detect some ad preferences that represent sensitive per-
sonal data we have the proof that they have been assigned
to real FB users. Based on this principle our dataset is cre-
ated from the ad preferences collected from real users who
have installed the FDVT. We note that the number of ad pref-
erences retrieved from the FDVT represents just a subset of
the overall set of preferences, but we can guarantee that they
have been assigned to real users. Our dataset includes the
ad preferences from 4577 users who installed the FDVT be-
tween October 2016 and October 2017, from which 3166
users come from some EU country. The 4577 FDVT users
have been assigned in total 5.5M ad preferences from which
we derive 126192 unique.
Our dataset includes the following information for each ad
preference:
10https://www.facebook.com/legal/self service ads terms
11https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/
12https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited content/personal attributes
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- ID of the ad preference: This is the key we use to identify
an ad preference independently of the language used by
a FB user. For instance, the ad preference {Milk, Leche,
Lait} that refers to the same thing in English, Spanish and
French, is assigned a single FB ID. Therefore, we can
uniquely identify each ad preference across all EU coun-
tries and languages.
- Name of the ad preference: This is the primary descriptor
of the ad preference. FB returns a unified version of the
name for each ad preference ID, usually in English. Hence,
we have the English name of the ad preferences irrespec-
tively of the original language at the collection time. We
note that in some cases translating the ad preference name
does not make sense (e.g., the case of persons’ names:
celebrities, politicians, etc.).
- Disambiguation Category: For some ad preferences Face-
book adds this in a separate field or in parenthesis to clar-
ify the meaning of a particular ad preference (e.g., Violet
(color); Violet: Clothing (Brand)) We have identified more
than 700 different disambiguation category topics (e.g., Po-
litical Ideology, Disease, Book, Website, Sport Team, etc.).
- Topic Category: Some of the 14 first level interests intro-
duced in Section Facebook Ads Manager are assigned in
many cases to contextualize ad preferences. For instance,
Manchester United F.C. is linked to Sports and Outdoors.
- Audience Size: This value reports the number of Facebook
users that have been assigned with the ad preferenceworld-
wide.
- Reason why the ad preference is added to the user: The
reason why the ad preference has been assigned to the user
according to FB. There are 6 possible reasons already in-
troduced in Subsection Facebook ad preferences.
Figure 2 shows the CDF of the number of ad preferences
per user. In median, each FDVT user is assigned 474 pref-
erences. Moreover, Figure 3 shows the CDF of the portion of
FDVT users (x-axis) that got assigned a given ad preference
(y-axis). We observe a very skewed distribution that indicates
that most ad preferences are actually assigned to a small frac-
tion of users. For instance, in median, an ad preference is
assigned to only 3 (0.06%) FDVT users. However, it is im-
portant to note that still many ad preferences reach a relevant
portion of users. Our dataset includes 1000 ad preferences
that reach at least 11% FDVT users.
METHODOLOGY
Our final goal is to quantify the number of EU FB users that
have been assigned sensitive ad preferences. To this end, we
use as reference the 126K unique ad preferences assigned to
FDVT users and follow a two-step process. In the first step,
we combine Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques
with humanmanual classification to obtain the list of sensitive
ad preferences from the 126K considered. In the second step,
we leverage the FB Ads Manager API to quantify how many
FB users in each EU country have been assigned at least one
of the ad preferences labeled as sensitive.
Identification of Sensitive Ad Preferences
We rely on a group of researchers with some knowledge in the
area of privacy to manually identify the sensitive ad prefer-
ences within our pool of 126K ad preferences retrieved from
FDVT users. However, classifying manually 126K ad pref-
erences does not scale13. To make this manual classifica-
tion task scalable, we leverage NLP techniques to pre-filter
the list of ad preferences more likely to be sensitive. This
pre-filtering phase will deliver a subset of likely sensitive ad
preferences that can be manually classified in a reasonable
amount of time.
Pre-filtering
Sensitive Categories
To identify likely sensitive ad preferences in an automatic
manner, we select five of the most relevant categories
listed as Sensitive Personal Data by the GDPR: (i) data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, (ii) data revealing political
opinions, (iii) data revealing religious or philosophical
beliefs, (iv) data concerning health, and (v) data con-
cerning sex life and sexual orientation. We selected these
categories because a preliminary manual inspection indi-
cated that there are ad preferences in our dataset that can
likely reveal information related to them. For instance,
the ad preferences “Socialism”,“Islam”,“Reproductive
Health”,“Homosexuality”,“Chinese culture” may reveal
political opinion, religious belief, health issue, sexual ori-
entation, ethnic or racial origin of the users that have been
assigned them, respectively. Note that all these examples of
ad preferences have been extracted from our dataset; thus
they have been assigned to actual FB users.
Our automatic process will classify an ad preference as likely
sensitive if we can semantically map that ad preference name
into one of the five sensitive categories analyzed in this pa-
per. To this end, we have defined a dictionary including both
keywords and short sentences representative of each of the
five considered sensitive categories. We have used two data
sources to create the dictionary: First, a list of controver-
sial issues available in Wikipedia14. In particular, we have
selected the following categories from this list: politics and
economics, religion and, sexuality. Second, we have ob-
tained a list of words with a very similar semantic meaning
to the five sensitive personal data categories. To this end,
we have used the Datamuse API15, a word-finding query en-
gine that allows developers to find words that match a set of
constraints. Among other functionalities, Datamuse allows
“finding words with a similar meaning to X” using a simple
query.
The final dictionary includes 264 keywords16. We leverage
the keywords in this dictionary to find ad preferences that
present high semantic similarity to at least one of these key-
words. In such case, we tag them as likely sensitive ad pref-
erences. It is worth noting that this approach makes our
13If we consider 10s as the average time required to classify an ad preference as sensitive
vs. non-sensitive, a person would need roughly 44 full working days of 8 hours only
dedicated to this task.
14https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List of controversial issues
15https://www.datamuse.com/api/
16https://fdvt.org/usenix2018/keywords.html
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Figure 2. CDF of the number of ad preferences
per FDVT user.
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Figure 3. CDF of the portion of FDVT users (x-
axis) per ad preference (y-axis).
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Figure 4. CDF of the semantic similarity score
assigned to the 126K ad preferences from the
FDVT dataset.
methodology flexible since the dictionary can be extended to
include new keywords for the already considered categories,
or related to other sensitive categories.
We next describe the semantic similarity computation in de-
tail.
Semantic Similarity Computation
The semantic similarity computation process takes two in-
puts: the 126K ad preferences from our FDVT dataset and
the 264 keywords dictionary associated with the considered
sensitive categories. We compute the semantic similarity of
each ad preference with all the 264 keywords from the dictio-
nary. For each ad preference, we record the highest similarity
value out of the 264 comparison operations. As result of this
process, each one of the 126K ad preferences is assigned a
similarity score, which indicates its likelihood to be a sensi-
tive ad preference.
To implement the semantic similarity comparison task, we
leverage the Spacy package for python17
Spacy is a free open source package for advance NLP op-
erations. Spacy offers multiple NLP features such as in-
formation extraction, natural language understanding, deep
learning for text, semantic similarity analysis, etc., which
are accomplished through different predefined models. To
conduct our analysis, we leverage the “similarity” feature of
Spacy that allows comparing two words or short text pro-
viding a semantic similarity value ranging between 0 (low-
est) and 1 (highest). This feature computes similarity using
the so-called Glove (Global vectors for word representation)
method [24]. Gloves are multi-dimensional meaning repre-
sentations of words computed using word2vec [18][19][20].
Spacy word vectors are trained using a large corpus of text
incorporating a rich vocabulary. In addition, Spacy also takes
into account context to define the representation of a word,
which allows to better identify its meaning considering the
surroundingwords. Spacy offers different models to optimize
the semantic similarity computation. We have chosen the
model en core web md18 because it optimizes the similarity
analysis between words and short sentences, which matches
the nature of ad preferences names. The chosen model is
an English multi-task Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
trained on OntoNotes [29] with GloVe vectors that are in turn
trained on Common Crawl 19. Common Crawl is an open
17https://spacy.io
18https://spacy.io/models/en#en core web md
19http://commoncrawl.org/
source repository for crawling data. The model uses word
vectors, context-specific token vectors, POS (part-of-speech)
tags, dependency parse and named entities.
We have chosen Spacy because it has been previously used in
the literature for text processing purposes offering good per-
formance [16][23]. Moreover, Spacy offers good scalability.
It computes the 33314688 (126192 x 264) semantic similar-
ity computations in 7 min using a server with twelve 2.6GHZ
cores and 96GB of RAM. To conduct our analysis we lever-
age the similarity feature of Spacy. This feature allows com-
paring words, text spans or documents, and computes the se-
mantic similarity among them. The output is a semantic sim-
ilarity value ranging between 0 and 1. The closer to 1 the
higher the semantic similarity is.
The execution of the explained process revealed very low
similarity values in some cases in which the analyzed ad pref-
erencematched pretty well the definition of some of the sensi-
tive personal data categories. Some of these cases are: physi-
cal persons such as politicians (which may reveal the polit-
ical opinion of the user); political parties with names that
do not include any standard political term; health diseases or
places of religious cult that may have names with low seman-
tic similarity with health and religious related keywords in our
dictionary, respectively. Three examples illustrating the re-
ferred cases are: <name: “Angela Merkel”, disambiguation:
Politician>; <name: “I Love Italy”, disambiguation: Politi-
cal Party>;<name: “Kegel” exercise, disambiguation: Med-
ical procedure>. We realized that in most of these cases the
disambiguation category is actually a better element than the
ad preference name to perform the semantic similarity anal-
ysis. For instance, in the case of politicians names, political
parties and health diseases the disambiguation category field
includes the term “politician”, “Political Party” and “dis-
ease”, respectively. The disambiguation category field is also
very useful for ad preference names that have multiple mean-
ings since it allows to determine which of those meanings a
specific ad preference is actually referring to.
Overall, we found that for classifying ad preferences, the
disambiguation category, when it is available, is a better
proxy than the ad preference name. Therefore, in case the ad
preference under analysis has associated a disambiguation
category field, we used the disambiguation category string
instead of the ad preference name to obtain the semantic
similarity score of the ad preference.
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Selection of likely sensitive ad preferences
The semantic similarity computation process assigns a sim-
ilarity score to each one of the 126K ad preferences in our
dataset. This similarity score represents the likelihood for an
ad preference to be sensitive.
In this step of the process, we have to select a relatively high
similarity score threshold that allows us to create a subset of
likely sensitive ad preferences that can be manually labeled
using a reasonable amount of resources (i.e., number of per-
sons, and time required per person to label ad preferences).
Figure 4 shows the CDF for the semantic similarity score of
the 126K ad preferences. The curve is flat in its initial and
final part, with a big rise between similarity values 0.25 and
0.6. This big rise implies that setting our threshold in val-
ues below 0.6 would result in a rapid growth of the number
of ad preferences to be manually tagged. Therefore, we have
decided to set up the semantic similarity threshold in 0.6 be-
cause it corresponds to a relatively high similarity score, and
the resulting subset includes 4452 ad preferences (3.5% out
of the 126K), which is an affordable number to be manually
tagged.
Note that the CDF shows two jumps at similarity scores equal
to 0.5 and 0.58. The first one is linked to the disambiguation
category “Local Business” while the second one refers to the
disambiguation category “Public Figure”. Overall, we do not
expect to find a significant number of sensitive ad preferences
within these disambiguation categories. Hence, this observa-
tion reinforces our semantic similarity threshold selection of
0.6.
Manual Classification of Sensitive Ad Preferences
We have recruited twelve panelists. All of them are re-
searchers (faculty and Ph.D. students) with some knowledge
in the area of privacy. Each panelist has manually classified a
random sample (between 1000 and 4452 elements) from the
4452 ad preferences included in the filtered dataset described
above. We asked them to classify each ad preference into one
of the five considered sensitive categories (Politics, Health,
Ethnicity, Religion, Sexuality), in the category “Other” (if it
does not correspond to any of the sensitive categories), or in
the category “Not known” (if the panelist does not know the
meaning of the ad preference). To carry out the manual la-
beling of ad preferences the researchers were given all the
contextual information Facebook offers per ad preference: ad
preference name, disambiguation category (if it is available)
and topic (if it is available). The literal instructions given to
the researchers to complete the classification task were: “As-
sign only one category per ad preference. If you think that
more than one category applies to an ad preference use only
the one you think is more relevant. If none of the categories
match the ad preference, classify it as ‘Other’. In case you
do not know the meaning of an ad preference please read the
disambiguation category and topic that may help you. If after
reading them you still are unable to classify the ad preference,
use ‘Not known’ to classify it.”
Each ad preference has been manually classified by five pan-
elists. We use majority voting [21] to classify each ad pref-
votes 0 1 2 3 4 5
#preferences 1054 767 539 422 449 1221
Table 1. Number of ad preferences that have received 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
votes classifying them into one sensitive data categories.
erence either as sensitive or non-sensitive. This is, we label
an ad preference as sensitive if at least 3 voters (i.e., the ma-
jority) classify it in one of the 5 sensitive categories and as
non-sensitive otherwise.
Table 1 shows the number of ad preferences that have re-
ceived 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 votes classifying them into a sensi-
tive category. 2092 out of the 4452 ad preferences are labeled
as sensitive, i.e., have been classified into a sensitive category
by at least 3 voters. This represents 1,66% of the 126K ad
preferences from our dataset.
An ad preference classified as sensitive may have been as-
signed to different sensitive categories (e.g., politics and
religion) by different voters. We have evaluated the vot-
ers’ agreement across the sensitive categories assigned to ad
preferences labeled as sensitive using the Fleiss’ Kappa test
[10][11]. The Fleiss’ Kappa coefficient obtained is 0.94. This
indicates an almost perfect agreement among the panelists’
votes that link an ad preference to a sensitive category[17].
Hence, we conclude that (almost) every ad preference clas-
sified as sensitive corresponds to a unique sensitive category
among the 5 considered.
The 2092 ad preferences manually labeled as sensitive are
distributed as follows across the five sensitive categories:
58.3% are related to politics, 20.8% to religion, 18.2% to
health, 1.5% to sexuality, 1.1% to ethnicity and just 0.2%
present discrepancy among votes. The complete list of the
ad preferences classified as sensitive can be accessed in20.
Retrieving the number of FB users assigned sensitive ad
preferences from the FB Ads Manager
We leverage the FB Ads Manager API to retrieve the num-
ber of FB users in each EU country that have been assigned
each of the 2092 ad preferences labeled as sensitive. Besides,
we have sorted the sensitive ad preferences from the most to
the least popular in each country. This allows us to compute
the number of FB users assigned at least with one of the Top
N sensitive ad preferences (with N ranging between 1 and
2092). To obtain this information we use the OR operation
available in the FB Ads Manager API to create audiences.
This feature allows us to retrieve how many users in a given
country are interested in ad preference 1 OR ad preference
2 OR ad preference 3... OR ad preference N. An example
of this for N = 3 could be “how many people in France are
interested in Communism OR Islam OR Veganism”.
Although the number of users is a relevant metric, it does not
offer a fair comparative result to assess the importance of the
problem across countries because we can find EU countries
with tens of millions of users (e.g., France, Germany, Italy,
etc) and some others with less than a million (e.g., Malta,
Luxembourg, etc). Hence, we will use the portion of users in
20https://fdvt.org/usenix2018/panelists.html
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reason of assignment all ad preferences sensitive ad preferences
due to a like 71.64% 81.36%
due to an ad click 21.51% 15.85%
FB suggests it could be relevant 4.83% 2.45%
due to an app installation 1.78% 0.04%
due to comments or reaction buttons 0.18% 0.26%
added by user 0.04% 0.03%
unclear or not gathered by FDVT 0.01% 0.01%
Table 2. Frequency of the 6 reasons why ad preferences are assigned to
FDVT EU users according to FB explanations.
each country that have been assigned sensitive ad preferences
as the metric to analyze the results. Beyond FB users we are
also interested in quantifying the portion of citizens assigned
sensitive ad preferences in each EU country. We have defined
two metrics used in the rest of the paper:
- FFB(C,N): This is the percentage of FB users in country
C that have been assigned at least one of the top N sen-
sitive ad preferences. We note C may also refer to all 28
EU countries together when we want to analyze the results
for the whole EU. It is computed as the ratio between the
number of FB users that have been assigned at least one of
the top N sensitive ad preferences and the total number of
FB users in country C, which can be retrieved from the FB
Ads Manager.
- FC(C,N): This is the percentage of citizens in countryC (or
all EU countries together) that have been assigned at least
one of the top N sensitive ad preferences. It is computed
as the ratio between the number of citizens that have been
assigned at least one of the top N sensitive ad preference
and the total population of country C. We use World Bank
data to obtain EU countries population21.
Note that FFB(C,N) and FC(C,N) will report a lower bound
concerning the total percentage of FB users and citizens in
country C tagged with sensitive ad preferences for two rea-
sons. First, these metrics can use at most N = 2092 sensitive
ad preferences, which is very likely a subset of all sensitive
ad preferences available on FB. Second, the FB Ads Man-
ager API only allows creating audiences with at most 1000
interests (i.e., ad preferences). Beyond 1000 interests the API
provides a fixed number of FB users independently of the de-
fined audience. This fixed number is 2.1Bwhich to the best of
our knowledge refers the total number of FB users included in
the Ads Manager. Therefore, in practice, the maximum value
of N we can use in FFB and FC is 1000.
QUANTIFYING THE EXPOSITION OF EU USERS TO SEN-
SITIVE AD PREFERENCES
In this section, we first analyze the exposition of the FDVT
users to the 2092 sensitive ad preferences found in the previ-
ous section. Afterwards, we use the FFB and FC metrics to
analyze the exposition of EU FB users and citizens to those ad
preferences. Finally, we perform a demographic analysis to
understand whether users from certain gender or age groups
are more exposed to sensitive ad preferences.
21https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=EU
FDVT Users
4121 (90%) FDVT users are tagged with at least one sen-
sitive ad preference. Overall, the 2092 unique sensitive ad
preferences have been assigned more than 146K times to the
FDVT users. If we focus only on EU users, which are the
subject of study in this paper, 2848 (90%) have been tagged
with sensitive ad preferences. Overall, they have been as-
signed more than 100K sensitive interests (1528 unique). The
median (avg) number of sensitive ad preferences assigned to
FDVT users is 10 (16). The 25th and 75th percentiles are 5
and 21, respectively.
Our FDVT dataset includes the reason why, according to FB,
each ad preference has been assigned to a user. Table 2 shows
the frequency of each reason for both all ad preferences and
only sensitive ad preferences. The results indicate that most
of the sensitive ad preferences are derived from users likes
(81%) or clicks on ads (16%). There are very few cases
(0.03%) in which users proactively include sensitive ad pref-
erences in their list of ad preferences using the configuration
setting offered by FB. We remind that, according to the EU
GDPR, Facebook should obtain explicit permission to pro-
cess and exploit sensitive personal data. Users likes and clicks
on ads do not seem to meet this requirement.
EU FB users and citizens
Figure 5 shows the FFB (C,N) for values of N ranging be-
tween 1 and 1000. The figure reports the max, min and avg
values across the 28 EU countries. We observe that even if we
consider a low number of sensitive ad preferences, the frac-
tion of affected users is very significant. For instance, in av-
erage 60% FB users from EU countries are tagged with some
of the top 10 (i.e., most popular) sensitive ad preferences.
Moreover, we observe that FFB is stable for values of N rang-
ing between 500 and 1000. We note that we have obtained the
same stable result for each individual EU country. This indi-
cates that any user tagged with sensitive ad preferences out-
side the top 50022 has been very likely already tagged with
at least one sensitive ad preference within the top 500. We
conjecture that this asymptotic behavior may indicate that the
lower bound represented by FFB(C, N=500) is close to the
actual fraction of FB users tagged with sensitive ad prefer-
ences.
Table 3 shows FFB(C,N=500) and FC(C,N=500) for every
EU country. The last row in the table shows aggregated re-
sults for the 28 EU countries together (EU28).
We observe that 73% EU FB users, that corresponds to 40%
EU citizens, are tagged with some of the top 500 sensitive
ad preferences in our dataset. If we focus on individual coun-
tries, FC(C,N=500) reveals that in 7 of themmore than half of
their citizens are tagged with at least one of the top 500 sensi-
tive ad preferences: Malta (66.37%), Cyprus (64.95% ), Swe-
den (54.53%), Denmark (54.09%), Ireland (52.38%), Portu-
gal (51.33%) and Great Britain (50.28%). In contrast, the
5 countries least impacted are: Germany (30.24%), Poland
(31.62%), Latvia (33.67%), Slovakia (35%) and Czech Re-
public (35.98%). Moreover, FFB(C,N=500) ranges between
22The top 500 list by country can be accessed at https://fdvt.org/usenix2018/top500.html
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country C FFB(C,500) FC (C,500) country C FFB(C,500) FC (C,500)
Austria AT 75.00 37.73 Ireland IE 80.65 52.38
Belgium BE 70.27 45.82 Italy IT 79.41 44.55
Bulgaria BG 72.97 37.88 Latvia LV 72.53 33.67
Croatia HR 80.00 38.36 Lithuania LT 75.00 41.78
Cyprus CY 79.17 64.95 Luxembourg LU 72.22 44.60
Czech Republic CZ 71.70 35.98 Malta MT 80.56 66.37
Denmark DK 77.50 54.09 Netherlands NL 74.55 48.18
Estonia EE 66.67 36.46 Poland PL 75.00 31.62
Finland FI 70.97 40.04 Portugal PT 81.54 51.33
France FR 65.79 37.37 Romania RO 75.76 38.06
Germany DE 67.57 30.24 Spain ES 74.07 43.06
Great Britain GB 75.00 50.28 Slovakia SK 70.37 35.00
Greece GR 77.19 40.94 Slovenia SI 78.00 37.78
Hungary HU 75.44 43.80 Sweden SE 73.97 54.53
European Union EU 73.25 40.63
Table 3. Percentage of EU FB users (FFB) and citizens (FC) per EU
Country that has been assigned some of the Top 500 sensitive ad prefer-
ences within their country. The last row reports the aggregated number
of all 28 EU countries together.
65% for France and 81% for Portugal. This means that at
least 2/3 FB users in any EU country are tagged with some of
the top 500 sensitive ad preferences.
These results draw a worrisome situation where a very signif-
icant part of the EU population is exposed to being targeted
by advertising campaigns based on sensitive personal data.
Very Sensitive Ad Preferences
The GDPR clearly defines what sensitive data is. Online ser-
vices should guarantee that sensitive data is neither collected
nor processed to comply with the legislation unless some of
the exceptions apply (see Section General Data Protection
Regulation). Despite this consideration, most people prob-
ably agree that all sensitive information is not equally sensi-
tive. For instance, data revealing the sexual preference of a
user is in principle more sensitive than data revealing a user
may be on a diet to lose some weight.
We acknowledge that the level of sensitivity varies across sen-
sitive ad preferences included in our dataset. Hence, although
they have been classified as sensitive by 12 panelists, some-
one may still argue that in his or her opinion some of the sen-
sitive ad preferences in our dataset are not actually sensitive
and thus the results reported in the previous subsection may
not be accurate.
In this subsection, we prove that even in the case when we
focus on manually selected sensitive ad preferences, which
doubtlessly matches the GDPR definition of sensitive data,
the percentage of EU FB users and citizens affected is still
very high.
In particular, we have selected 20 ad preferences that we refer
to as very sensitive. A very sensitive ad preference is defined
as an ad preference that all the 12 panelists and the authors
would consider offensive if it were assigned to him/herself
or a relative (e.g., spouse, children, parents). Tables 4 and
5 show the percentage of FB users (FFB) and citizens (FC)
tagged with each of the 20 very sensitive ad preferences per
EU country. Note that the last row presents the aggregate re-
sults for the 20 very sensitive ad preferences in each country,
and the last column presents the aggregate results for the 28
EU countries together.
We observe that 42.9% EU FB users, which corresponds to
23.5% EU citizens, are tagged with at least one of the very
sensitive ad preferences, respectively. Hence, around one-
quarter of the EU population has been tagged in FB with ad
preferences that are doubtlessly related to sensitive data as
reported by the GDPR. If we analyze the results per country,
we observe that the fraction of the population affected ranges
between 15% in Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV) and Poland (PL)
and 38% in Malta (MT). These observations confirm the ex-
istence of a worrisome privacy problem for EU citizens.
Age and Gender analysis
We analyze the exposition of different demographic groups
(based on gender and age) to sensitive ad preferences. The
gender analysis considers two groups, men vs. women, while
the age analysis considers four age groups following the di-
vision proposed by Erikson et al. [7]: 13-19 (Adolescence),
20-39 (Early Adulthood), 40-64 (Adulthood) and 65+ (Matu-
rity). For each group, we compute FFB(C = EU28, N = 500)
and FFB(C = EU28, N = 20 very sensitive ad preferences).
Figures 6 and 7 report the results for age and gender groups,
respectively.
The Early Adulthood is clearly the most exposed group to
sensitive ad preferences. Especially, 61% (45%) users in
this group have been tagged with some of the Top 500 (20-
very) sensitive ad preferences. Following the Early Adult-
hood group we find the Adolescence, Adulthood and Matu-
rity groups with 55% (42%), 40% (32%) and 39% (28%) of
its users tagged with some of the Top 500 (20-very) sensi-
tive ad preferences, respectively. Although the difference in
the exposition to sensitive ad preferences is substantial across
groups, all of them present a considerably high exposure. In
particular, more than one-quarter of the users within every
group is exposed to very sensitive ad preferences.
The gender-based analysis shows that women exposition to
the Top 500 (20-very) sensitive ad preferences reaches 78%
(49%). The exposition is notably smaller for men, where the
fraction of tagged users with some of the Top 500 (20-very)
sensitive ad preferences shrinks by 10 (18) percentage points
to 68% (31%). This result suggests the existence of a gender
bias, which despite its obvious interest is out of the scope of
this paper.
PROOF OF COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF SENSITIVE
AD PREFERENCES WITH REAL FB AD CAMPAIGNS
The analysis conducted so far has just proved that Facebook
labels a significant portion of EU citizens using sensitive per-
sonal data. In this section, we prove that FB is exploiting sen-
sitive personal data for commercial purposes through adver-
tising campaigns. We ran 3 FB ad campaigns using sensitive
ad preferences: “religious beliefs” (targeting users interested
in Islam OR Judaism OR Christianity OR Buddhism), “polit-
ical opinions” (targeting users interested in Communism OR
Anarchism OR Radical feminism OR Socialism) and “sexual
orientation” (targeting users interested in TranssexualismOR
Homosexuality). The 3 campaigns focused on four EU coun-
tries: Germany, Spain, France and Italy.
Overall, with a budget of e35 we were able to reach 26458
users tagged with some of the previous sensitive ad prefer-
ences. Our credit card was charged and we received the bills
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name AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE GB EU28
COMMUNISM 0.48 0.61 1.35 1.30 1.67 3.21 0.38 0.61 0.52 2.29 0.43 0.81 0.74 0.52 1.15 0.56 0.94 0.64 0.39 0.24 2.19 0.94 1.90 1.74 1.70 0.56 0.30 0.41 0.93
ISLAM 8.18 7.16 4.59 5.50 13.54 4.91 6.75 2.22 4.19 7.89 7.57 4.21 2.28 4.19 4.12 2.75 2.38 5.00 6.67 5.36 2.44 3.69 3.50 3.11 6.50 4.07 6.58 6.82 5.71
QURAN 3.41 3.38 1.08 1.00 4.48 0.45 1.90 0.65 1.16 3.95 3.24 1.18 0.74 1.35 1.71 1.01 0.51 1.83 1.86 2.45 0.45 0.62 0.77 0.56 2.00 0.96 2.74 3.64 2.46
SUICIDE PREVENTION 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.12 1.10 0.28 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.27 0.28
SOCIALISM 1.00 0.78 0.57 0.48 1.15 2.45 3.00 0.76 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.91 1.93 1.10 3.53 0.34 0.94 2.78 1.08 0.28 0.50 2.15 0.35 2.33 0.82 1.48 1.37 0.93 1.21
JUDAISM 2.50 1.16 0.86 0.70 2.29 0.72 2.17 1.01 0.61 1.26 1.38 1.30 1.16 1.26 2.29 1.76 1.81 1.19 3.06 1.00 1.19 1.69 1.40 0.93 0.74 1.15 0.64 0.95 1.32
HOMOSEXUALITY 6.14 5.54 2.97 6.50 4.38 5.47 5.00 3.89 5.16 7.37 5.68 5.09 4.21 9.03 7.65 4.62 3.19 5.00 7.50 6.18 3.56 4.46 3.80 4.44 7.60 8.15 4.93 8.64 6.79
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 5.00 2.97 8.38 6.00 5.62 4.15 4.00 4.17 4.19 2.89 3.24 7.19 4.21 9.68 6.18 3.96 2.56 5.56 7.50 3.64 2.25 8.00 3.90 2.93 5.00 5.56 3.84 6.14 4.29
CHRISTIANITY 10.68 7.43 6.22 7.50 9.69 3.77 15.00 2.22 4.19 5.53 6.49 6.67 9.30 10.97 12.65 3.19 3.81 7.22 18.89 5.18 6.25 12.46 10.00 4.81 4.60 10.00 4.66 7.50 8.21
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.68 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.36 0.14 0.33 0.05 0.09
ONCOLOGY 0.23 0.27 0.62 0.44 3.96 0.57 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.49 0.30 1.29 0.94 0.70 1.62 0.19 0.78 0.45 1.25 1.09 0.73 0.59 0.21 0.70 0.08 0.66 0.61
LGBT COMMUNITY 6.36 6.62 5.14 6.50 6.56 6.04 6.50 5.14 6.45 7.11 5.95 5.79 4.39 11.94 8.53 5.27 5.88 6.67 9.44 6.36 5.88 7.85 6.30 4.81 6.00 7.04 6.44 11.14 8.21
GENDER IDENTITY 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.88 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.56 0.07 0.23 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.55 0.10
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.71 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.07
BIBLE 17.95 10.81 8.65 10.50 11.46 7.17 12.75 4.31 4.84 7.63 15.41 8.25 10.00 19.03 17.65 5.71 6.25 14.44 20.28 10.91 14.38 12.31 8.70 6.67 7.40 7.04 5.48 15.68 12.14
PREGNANCY 15.68 12.97 9.19 17.00 13.54 16.23 14.50 10.00 11.29 10.79 11.89 13.51 11.23 20.97 12.35 13.19 18.75 12.78 9.72 14.55 15.00 18.46 9.70 18.89 13.00 14.07 13.42 18.41 14.29
NATIONALISM 0.86 0.78 1.65 1.85 2.19 2.45 1.00 0.58 0.45 1.08 1.00 1.74 2.11 2.00 1.32 2.42 0.94 2.19 2.78 0.70 3.00 1.69 2.50 1.37 0.61 1.11 0.99 0.91 1.39
VEGANISM 14.55 10.27 7.30 10.50 10.21 9.25 12.75 9.86 15.16 8.68 11.35 9.82 9.82 14.84 13.53 9.23 8.12 13.06 13.33 10.91 8.12 11.23 6.70 8.52 14.00 10.37 16.44 13.64 11.43
BUDDHISM 3.18 3.38 1.62 3.55 3.33 2.26 2.08 1.53 1.13 2.61 1.43 2.63 3.33 3.87 2.94 1.98 1.88 3.33 4.17 2.45 1.31 6.92 1.90 1.67 3.00 2.19 1.51 2.50 2.39
FEMINISM 4.55 3.78 3.51 3.80 5.52 2.08 5.50 2.78 6.77 5.00 3.78 3.68 2.46 9.35 5.88 3.19 3.56 5.83 8.61 3.64 3.44 8.15 2.40 4.07 3.90 8.89 13.70 7.27 7.50
UNION 45.45 39.19 32.43 41.50 45.83 37.74 45.00 27.78 35.48 34.21 40.54 36.84 36.84 51.61 44.12 32.97 36.25 41.67 47.22 40.00 36.88 44.62 34.34 35.56 39.00 40.74 41.10 47.73 42.86
Table 4. Percentage of FB users (FFB) per EU country that have been assigned each of the 20 very sensitive ad preferences listed in the table. The last
row reports the aggregated FFB value for all 20 ad preferences per EU country. The last column reports the aggregated FFB value across all 28 EU
countries.
name AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE GB EU28
COMMUNISM 0.24 0.40 0.70 0.62 1.37 1.61 0.26 0.33 0.29 1.30 0.19 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.64 0.26 0.52 0.39 0.32 0.15 0.92 0.59 0.96 0.87 0.82 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.51
ISLAM 4.12 4.67 2.39 2.64 11.11 2.46 4.71 1.22 2.37 4.48 3.39 2.23 1.32 2.72 2.31 1.28 1.32 3.09 5.49 3.47 1.03 2.32 1.78 1.55 3.15 2.37 4.85 4.57 3.13
QURAN 1.71 2.20 0.56 0.48 3.67 0.23 1.33 0.36 0.66 2.24 1.45 0.62 0.43 0.88 0.96 0.47 0.28 1.13 1.53 1.59 0.19 0.39 0.39 0.28 0.97 0.56 2.02 2.44 1.35
SUICIDE PREVENTION 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.71 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.15
SOCIALISM 0.50 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.94 1.23 2.09 0.42 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.48 1.12 0.71 1.98 0.16 0.52 1.72 0.89 0.18 0.21 1.36 0.18 1.16 0.40 0.86 1.01 0.62 0.66
JUDAISM 1.26 0.76 0.45 0.34 1.88 0.36 1.52 0.55 0.35 0.72 0.62 0.69 0.67 0.82 1.29 0.82 1.01 0.74 2.52 0.65 0.50 1.07 0.71 0.46 0.36 0.67 0.47 0.64 0.72
HOMOSEXUALITY 3.09 3.61 1.54 3.12 3.59 2.75 3.49 2.13 2.91 4.19 2.54 2.70 2.44 5.87 4.29 2.14 1.78 3.09 6.18 4.00 1.50 2.81 1.93 2.21 3.68 4.74 3.64 5.79 3.71
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 2.52 1.94 4.35 2.88 4.61 2.08 2.79 2.28 2.37 1.64 1.45 3.82 2.44 6.29 3.47 1.84 1.43 3.43 6.18 2.35 0.95 5.04 1.98 1.46 2.42 3.23 2.83 4.11 2.34
CHRISTIANITY 5.37 4.85 3.23 3.60 7.95 1.89 10.47 1.22 2.37 3.14 2.90 3.54 5.40 7.12 7.10 1.48 2.12 4.46 15.56 3.35 2.64 7.85 5.07 2.39 2.23 5.81 3.43 5.03 4.49
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.04 0.05
ONCOLOGY 0.11 0.18 0.32 0.21 3.25 0.28 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.84 0.53 0.33 0.91 0.12 0.64 0.29 0.53 0.69 0.37 0.29 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.44 0.33
LGBT COMMUNITY 3.20 4.32 2.67 3.12 5.38 3.03 4.54 2.81 3.64 4.04 2.66 3.07 2.55 7.75 4.79 2.45 3.27 4.12 7.78 4.11 2.48 4.94 3.20 2.39 2.91 4.09 4.75 7.47 4.49
GENDER IDENTITY 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.30 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.37 0.05
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.46 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04
BIBLE 9.03 7.05 4.49 5.04 9.40 3.60 8.90 2.35 2.73 4.34 6.90 4.37 5.81 12.36 9.90 2.65 3.48 8.92 16.71 7.05 6.06 7.75 4.42 3.32 3.58 4.09 4.04 10.51 6.64
PREGNANCY 7.89 8.46 4.77 8.15 11.11 8.14 10.12 5.47 6.37 6.13 5.32 7.16 6.52 13.62 6.93 6.12 10.44 7.89 8.01 9.40 6.32 11.62 4.92 9.39 6.30 8.18 9.90 12.34 7.82
NATIONALISM 0.43 0.51 0.86 0.89 1.79 1.23 0.70 0.32 0.25 0.61 0.45 0.92 1.22 1.30 0.74 1.12 0.52 1.36 2.29 0.45 1.26 1.07 1.27 0.68 0.30 0.65 0.73 0.61 0.76
VEGANISM 7.32 6.70 3.79 5.04 8.38 4.64 8.90 5.39 8.55 4.93 5.08 5.21 5.70 9.64 7.59 4.28 4.53 8.06 10.99 7.05 3.43 7.07 3.40 4.24 6.78 6.03 12.12 9.14 6.25
BUDDHISM 1.60 2.20 0.84 1.70 2.73 1.14 1.45 0.84 0.64 1.48 0.64 1.40 1.94 2.51 1.65 0.92 1.04 2.06 3.43 1.59 0.55 4.36 0.96 0.83 1.45 1.27 1.11 1.68 1.31
FEMINISM 2.29 2.47 1.82 1.82 4.53 1.04 3.84 1.52 3.82 2.84 1.69 1.95 1.43 6.08 3.30 1.48 1.98 3.60 7.09 2.35 1.45 5.13 1.22 2.03 1.89 5.17 10.10 4.88 4.10
UNION 22.86 25.55 16.84 19.90 37.60 18.94 31.41 15.19 20.02 19.43 18.14 19.54 21.39 33.52 24.75 15.30 20.19 25.73 38.91 25.85 15.55 28.09 17.25 17.68 18.89 23.68 30.29 31.99 23.45
Table 5. Percentage of citizens (FC) per EU country that have been assigned each of the 20 very sensitive ad preferences listed in the table. The last row
reports the aggregated FC value for all 20 ad preferences per EU country. The last column reports the aggregated FC value across all 28 EU countries.
associated with our campaigns. Figure 8 shows a snapshot
of the Facebook summary report for each campaign. This
experiment provides substantial evidence that Facebook gen-
erates revenue from the commercial exploitation of sensitive
personal data according to the GDPR definition of sensitive
data.
Note that the conducted ad campaigns were compliant with
the Terms & Services of Facebook introduced in Section
Facebook Terms of Service
Figures 9 and 10 show the two ads we used in our campaigns.
These ads refer to our FDVT browser extension and thus they
do not include content that asserts or implies personal at-
tributes. Indeed, the landing page where users were redirected
in case they clicked in any of these ads is the webpage of the
FDVT project23.
Moreover, our experiments were compliant with the data pro-
tection legislation applicable to the authors’ institution. In
particular, in the experiments, we did not record any informa-
tion from those users clicking the ads and visiting our landing
page. The only information we use in this paper is the one
provided by FB through the reports it offers to advertisers re-
lated to their ad campaigns.
ETHICS AND PRIVACY RISKS ASSOCIATEDWITH SENSI-
TIVE PERSONAL DATA EXPLOITATION
The possibility of reaching users labeled with sensitive per-
sonal data enables the use of FB ads campaigns to attack spe-
cific groups of people based on sensitive personal data (race,
23https://www.fdvt.org/
sexual orientation, religious beliefs, etc.). Following, we il-
lustrate two specific examples of potential attacks.
Hate campaigns: An attacker could create hate-of-speech
campaigns using sensitive ad preferences representative of a
specific sensitive social group within its target audience. For
instance, a neo-nazi organization could create ads campaigns
with offensive messages targeting people interested in Ju-
daism or Homosexuality. This clearly presents important eth-
ical concerns since such hate-of-speech campaigns can reach
thousands of users at a very low cost (e.g., we reached more
than 26K FB users spending only e35 in FB ads campaigns).
Identification attack: An attacker can use FB as a proxy to
identify citizens belonging to a sensitive social group defined
by its religious belief, sexual orientation, political preference,
etc. To this end, an attacker just needs to replicate a phishing-
like attack [14]. The attacker would configure a campaign
targeting a sensitive audience (e.g., people interested in ho-
mosexuality) using a fancy advertisement that serves as bait
to attract the targeted users to the attacker’s webpage (e.g., the
ad promises the user to win an iPhone X if she clicks on the
ad). If the user clicks on the ad, she will be redirected to the
attacker’s webpage. Once there, the attacker can use different
techniques exploited in phishing attacks [14] persuading the
user to provide some personal data that would reveal her iden-
tity. For instance, in the example of the iPhone X, the landing
page can show a message congratulating the user for winning
the phone, and at the same time, it may request the user to
provide some personal data (name, address, phone number,
etc.) for shipping purposes.
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Figure 5. FFB (C,N) for values of N ranging be-
tween 1 and 1000. The figure reports the min,
average and max FFB value across the 28 EU
countries.
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Figure 6. Percentage of EU FB users assigned
at least one of the Top 500 (black) and 20-very
sensitive (grey) ad preferences in the following
age groups: 13-19, 20-39, 40-64, 65+.
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Figure 7. Percentage of EU FB users assigned
at least one of the Top 500 (black) and 20-very
sensitive (grey) ad preferences in the following
gender groups: Men, Women.
Figure 8. FB report from the 3 ad campaigns we ran targeting users
based on sensitive ad preferences.
Figure 9. FDVT ad 1 Figure 10. FDVT ad 2
A recent study [13] ran experiments implementing email-
based phishing attacks in which 9% of the users posted their
credentials (username and password) in the phishing site (i.e.,
attacker’s landing page). Using as a reference this success
rate for phishing attacks and the results from the ad cam-
paigns described in Section Proof of commercial exploita-
tion of sensitive ad preferences with real FB Ad Campaigns,
we can make a ball-park estimation of the cost of identifying
users tagged with sensitive ad preferences. We spent e35 in
our ads campaigns to reach 26K users from which 2.34K (ac-
cording to the 9% reference success rate) may fill some per-
sonal information in the attacker’s webpage that would unveil
their identity. Based on this, identifying an individual user
may be as cheap as e0.015. Even if we consider a success
rate two orders of magnitude smaller (0.09%), the cost would
be e1.5 per user.
The estimated cost to unveil the identity of users based on
sensitive personal data is rather low considering the serious
privacy risks users may face. For instance, (i) in coun-
tries where homosexuality is considered illegal or immoral
governments or other organizations could obtain the identity
of people that are likely homosexual (e.g., interested in ho-
mosexuality, LGBT, etc.); (ii) neo-nazis organizations could
identify people in specific regions (using as location target
a town or even a zip code) that are likely Jewish (e.g., in-
terested in Judaism, Shabbat, etc.); (iii) health assurance
companies could try to identify people that may have non-
profitable habits (e.g., interested in tobacco, fast food, etc.)
or health problems (e.g., food intolerance) for not accepting
them as clients or increasing the health insurance cost for
them. Besides, users may face the negative consequences
of such phishing-like attacks even in the case that FB has
wrongly labeled them with some sensitive ad preference.
In summary, although Facebook does not allow third parties
directly accessing individual users’ identity, ad preferences
can be used as a very powerful proxy to perform identifica-
tion attacks24 based on sensitive personal data at a low cost.
Note that we have simply illustrated the ad-based phishing
attack but not implemented it due to the obvious ethical im-
plications.
FDVT EXTENSION TO INFORM USERS ABOUT THEIR
SENSITIVE AD PREFERENCES
The results reported in previous sections urge to provide
solutions that make users aware of the use of sensitive
personal data for advertising purposes. To this end, we have
extended the FDVT browser extension to inform users about
the sensitive ad preferences that FB has assigned them: (i)
we have built a classifier to automatically tag ad preferences
assigned to FDVT users as sensitive or non-sensitive; (ii)
we have modified the FDVT back-end and front-end to
incorporate this new feature.
Automatic Binary Classifier for Sensitive Ad Preferences
We rely on the methodology described in Section Method-
ology to compute the semantic similarity between ad pref-
erences and sensitive personal data categories (i.e., politics,
religion, health, ethnicity and sexual orientation). We remind
that each ad preference is assigned a semantic similarity score
that ranges between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest). To build an
24The described attack can be implemented on any advertising platform allowing adver-
tisers to target users based on sensitive personal data.
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Figure 11. Test
automatic binary classifier we have to define a threshold so
that ad preferences over (below) it are classified as sensitive
(non-sensitive).
To set up this threshold, we use the manually labeled dataset
from Section Manual Classification of Sensitive Ad Prefer-
ences. It includes 4452 ad preferences , where 2092 were
classified as sensitive. We follow a standard training-testing
model approach. We randomly split our dataset in a train-
ing and a validation subsets that include 80% and 20% of the
samples, respectively. The training subset is used to find the
optimal threshold. In turn, we use the validation subset to as-
sess the performance of the selected threshold. The optimal
threshold is selected as the onemaximizing the F-score for the
training subset [25]. Moreover, we validate the performance
of the selected threshold computing the precision, recall and
F-score on the validation subset. We have performed 5000 re-
alizations of this process, each using different randomly cho-
sen testing and validation subsets, to prove the robustness of
the proposed binary classifier.
Figure 11 presents boxplots showing the AUC, precision, re-
call and F-score for the optimal threshold across the 5000 re-
alizations. The optimal threshold remains very stable rang-
ing between 0.68 and 0.69. Similarly, the AUC derived from
the ROC curve from our binary classifier presents a very sta-
ble result around 0.86, which is associated with a good per-
formance according to standard quality metrics in research
[9][30].
Finally, the median precision of our binary classifier is 0.835
(min = 0.75, max = 0.90) and the median recall is 0.78 (min
= 0.70, max = 0.86).
In summary, we conclude that the performance of the pro-
posed binary classifier is good enough to accomplish our goal
of showing FDVT users which of their ad preferences may be
linked to sensitive personal data. In turn, we expect that this
information helps to create an increasing collective awareness
among FB users regarding the use of sensitive personal data
for advertising purposes.
Figure 12. Webpage displaying sensitive preferences.
System implementation
FDVT Backend: We have computed the semantic similar-
ity score for all ad preferences stored in our database. We
have classified as sensitive and introduce in a blacklist those
ad preferences with a similarity score ≥0.69.25 Each time
a FDVT user starts a session in FB we retrieve her updated
set of ad preferences and compare them with the blacklist
to obtain the list of ad preferences linked to sensitive per-
sonal data. We store the history of sensitive ad preferences
assigned to the user to being able to notify her of sensitive ad
preferences that FB has removed. Finally, every time a user
is assigned a new ad preference that was not registered before
in our database, we compute its semantic similarity score and
include it in the blacklist if the ad preference is classified as
sensitive.
FDVT User Interface: We have introduced a new button in
the FDVT extension interface with the label ”Sensitive FB
Preferences”. When a user clicks on that button, we dis-
play a web page listing the sensitive ad preferences included
in the user’s ad preference set. Figure 12 shows a snapshot
of an example of such webpage. We provide the following
information for each sensitive ad preference: (i) Ad prefer-
ence name, (ii) Addition date, (iii) Deletion date (only for
removed sensitive ad preferences), (iv) Description, which
indicates the reason why FB has assigned that ad preference
to the user, (v) Status, either active (highlighted in green) or
deleted (highlighted in red).
RELATED WORK
We focus on discussing previous works that have addressed
issues associated with sensitive personal data in online adver-
tising and recent works that analyze privacy and discrimina-
tion issues related to FB advertising and ad preferences.
Carrascosa et al. [4] propose a new methodology to quantify
the portion of targeted ads received by Internet users while
they browse the web. They create bots, referred to as per-
sonas, with very specific interests profiles (e.g., persona in-
terested in cars) and measure how many of the received ads
actually match the specific interest of the analyzed persona.
They create personas based on sensitive personal data (e.g.,
health) and demonstrate that they are also targeted with ads
related to the sensitive information used to create the per-
sona’s profile. Castellucia et al. [5] shown that an attacker
that gets access (e.g., through a public WiFi network) to the
Google ads received by a user could create an interest profile
that could reveal up to 58% of the actual interests of the user.
They state that in the case that some of the unveiled interests
is sensitive, it could imply serious privacy risks for users.
25The value of the optimal threshold may change over the time since it will be recom-
puted periodically.
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Venkatadri et al. have recently presented their work that ex-
poses privacy [28] and discrimination [27] vulnerabilities re-
lated to FB advertising. In [28], the authors demonstrate how
an attacker can use Facebook third-party tracking javascript
to retrieve personal data (e.g., mobile phone number) asso-
ciated with users visiting the attacker’s website. Moreover,
in [27] they demonstrate that sensitive FB ad preferences can
be used to apply negative discrimination in advertising cam-
paigns (e.g., excluding people based on their race). They also
show that some ad preferences that initially may not seem
sensitive could be used to discriminate some social collective
in advertising campaigns (e.g., excluding people interested in
Blacknews.com that are potentially black people).
Finally, Andreou et al. [2] analyse whether the reasons FB
uses to explain why a user is targeted with an ad are aligned
with the actual audience the advertiser is targeting. To this,
they analyze an explanation that Facebook includes in each
delivered ad referred to as “Why Am I Seeing this Ad”. This
explanation describes the target audience associated with the
delivered ad. Out of the analysis of 79 ads, they conclude that
in many cases the provided explanations are incomplete and
sometimes misleading. They also perform a qualitative anal-
ysis related to the ad preferences assigned to FB user based on
a small dataset including 9K ad preferences distributed across
35 users. They conclude that the reasons why ad preferences
are assigned are vague.
In summary, the existing literature suggests that the online
advertising ecosystem (beyond Facebook) exploits sensitive
personal information for commercial purposes. In addition,
there are previous works that highlight several privacy and
ethics vulnerabilities associated with FB ad preferences. Our
work completes this body of literature quantifying the number
of users in FB that are exposed to the commercial exploitation
of their sensitive personal data.
IRB AND FDVT USERS’ CONSENT
The Ethics committee of the authors’ institution has provided
IRB approval to conduct the implementation of the FDVT and
the research activities derived from it.
To comply with the most rigorous ethics and legal standards,
during the installation process of the FDVT, a user has to: (i)
read and accept the Terms of Use26 and privacy policy27; (ii)
grant explicit permission to use the information stored (in an
anonymous manner) for research purposes.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that we did not gather any
information (neither personal or none personal) from those
users who clicked in the ads we used in the FB advertis-
ing campaigns described in Section Proof of commercial ex-
ploitation of sensitive ad preferences with real FB Ad Cam-
paigns.
CONCLUSION
Facebook is commercially exploiting sensitive personal data
for advertising purposes through the so-called ad preferences
that reveal potential interests of Facebook users. Facebook
26https://www.fdvt.org/terms of use/
27https://www.fdvt.org/privacy agreement.html
has already been fined in Spain for this practice. In May 2018
a new data protection regulation (GDPR), which prohibits the
processing of sensitive personal data, will be enforced in all
EU Countries. The short time until the GDPR application has
been one of our main motivations to measure the portion of
EU FB users, and the correspondent portion of citizens, that
have been assigned ad preferences linked to sensitive personal
data. The results reveal that such portion is as high as 73%
FB users (40% EU citizens). We illustrate how FB users that
have been assigned sensitive ad preferences could face seri-
ous privacy risks since the identity of some of them could
be unveiled at low-cost through simple phishing-like attacks.
The results of our paper urge a quick reaction from Facebook
to eliminate from its ad preferences list all those that can be
used to infer the politic orientation, sexual orientation, health
conditions, religious believes or ethnic origin of a user for two
reasons: (i) this will guarantee that Facebook complies with
the GDPR, (ii) it will preserve the privacy of the users from
attackers that aim to unveil the identity of groups of people
linked to (very) sensitive information.
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